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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
No.

-v-

15744

RONALD JOHN MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE.OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State
of Utah against Ronald John Martinez, defendant-appellant,
charging him with the crime of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value,
in violation of Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on January 31, 1978, after
a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the crime of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent
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to distribute for value.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this court reversing
the judgment rendered at trial and remanding the cause to
the trial court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Ronald John Martinez, was charged
in the information with the unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute for value.
The trial began on January 30, 1978, in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before the
Honorable Dean E. Conder, and concluded on January 31, 1978.
At trial eight witnesses testified.
Deputy George testified he first had contact

wi~

the defendant in a traffic stop on July 18, 1977, at approx·
imately 3900 South and 900 West (Tr. 13).

At that location,

prior to arrest, Deputy George advised appellant that he had
a right to remain silent; that anything said could and would
be used in court; that defendant had a right to an attorney
during questioning, and that one would be appointed without
cost; and received defendant's understanding of those rights
(Tr.

29, 30).

Defendant remained silent.

Deputies Michael George, Stephen Alexander, Randal'.
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Anderson, the defendant's wife, Sergeant Patiena, Deputy
Duncan, and Special Deputy Dorothy Akin were present after
the travel to 1158 Warbler.

They conducted a thorough

search of defendant's residence.

Then, after placing the

defendant under arrest, the interrogation began without a
fresh set of Miranda warnings.

It was only asked of the

defendant if he remembered his constitutional rights.

The

incriminating statement, "Yeah, I deal dope, but I sold my
last bag last night," was made by the appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY POLICE OFFICERS
WHEN APPELLANT HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN HIS
MIRANDA RIGHTS WHILE UNDER "CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION."
The United States Supreme Court's holding in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966) is based on the premise that in-custody interrogation creates an inherent compulsion on an individual
to incriminate himself in response to police questioning.
Statements obtained under circumstances are, therefore,
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled testimonial self-incrimination unless the
privilege is "knowingly and intelligently waived."

Id. at
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471, 475, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda
are limited to questioning while the defendant is in police
custody or significantly deprived of his freedom.

Again,

it is this environment which is innately coercive and
threatens Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.

In this

setting Miranda seeks to protect the defendant from selfincrimination.
The prosecution may not use statements
whether exculpatory or inculpatory
stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Id at 696, 384
U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)
(emphasis added).
Custodial interrogation was defined by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda as:
Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action
in an~ significant way.
Id. at
696, 84 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602
(1966) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the appellant was alleged~
read the Miranda warnings at the location of 3900 South 900
West, Salt Lake County (Tr. 30).

The appellant, however' was

-4-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not taken into custody at this time.

He was informed that

the police had a search warrant to search his alleged residence, but the appellant was given the free choice whether
to return with the police to execute said search warrant or
to go his own way

(Tr. 52).

The appellant's personal freedom was not restrained
in any "significant" way.
(Tr. 51, 52).

He was free to leave if he so chose

Consequently, the appellant was not under

"custodial interrogation" when read his rights.

The coercive

environment which Miranda was aimed at controlling was not
present.
The appellant was later placed under arrest at the
location of 1158 Warbler, Salt Lake County (Tr. 30, 31).
After being taken into custody, he was not given his constitutional rights as required by the United States Supreme
Court in Miranda.

The appellant was subsequently interro-

gated by Officer Michael George.
Undoubtedly, respondent would argue that since the
appellant was read his rights prior to arrest, this warning
would be a sufficient substitute to the requirement that his
rights be read while in custodial interrogation.

Miranda,

however, does not provide for any form of substitution as to
the time this warning is to be given.

-5-
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The purpose for Miranda is obvious, i.e. , protectk
from self-incrimination while under "custodial interrogation.
To not inform a person of his Fifth Amendment rights at the
time of interrogation is a flagrant violation of Miranda.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is
so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate
warning as to the availability
of the privilege so simple, we
will not pause to inquire in
individual cases whether defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given . . .
More important, whatever the
background of the person interrogated a warning at the time of
the interrogation is indispensable
to overcome its pressures and to
insure that the individual knows
he is free to exercise the privilege
at that )oint in time. Miranda
at 720, 84 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602 (1966) (emphasis added).
Strict compliance with Miranda was upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in United
State

v. Bensinger, 436 F.2d 576 (1972).

In this case

petitioner, in a writ of habeas corpus proceeding, was advisee
of his constitutional rights when taken into custody and agail
about an hour later.

Petitioner desired to remain silent.

Police officers, however, continually confronted him, im· t h e a b sence o_f counse 1 .
·
h im
· to ta lk in
p 1 oring

The court heli

that evidence obtained as the result of such police action wai

-6-
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not admissible.

The court further stated:
To be effective, those safeguards
must be fully observed and the
rights of the suspect must be
jealously guarded. Not even the
sli htest circumvention or avoidance mat e to erate . I . at
578. · ( mphasis added).

In the case at bar, the trial court relied on Oregon
v.

Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) in overruling defense

counsel's objection to the admission of statements made by
appellant while under custodial interrogation, but not having
been given his Miranda warnings.

Taken from the transcript

in relevant part, the trial court stated:
. . . as long as an individual
is in the coercive environment
where he is in such a restriction
of his freedom to render him in
custody, Miranda must be given.
(Tr. 33).
and
I think that having given it to
him at the site when they first
talked to him and then again by
referring back to it would be
sufficient and would overrule the
motion. (Tr. 33).
In Mathiason, the defendant on parole went to the
police station in response to a request by police officers.
He was not placed under arrest.

Defendant gave a half hour

interview during which he made a taped confession concerning

-7-
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his participation in a burglary.

The United States Supreme

Court held that the defendant was not in custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any "significant" way
and, therefore, it was not necessary that he be given the
Miranda warnings prior to confession.
The trial court interpreted this case incorrectly.
The factual situation in Mathiason created a more coercive
environment than in the present case, however, the United
States Supreme Court found the defendant was not under custodial interrogation.
parole.

In Mathiason the defendant was on

Whether he went to the police station voluntarily,

as a matter of free choice, is highly suspect.

The threat of

parole violation infringes on a parolee's freedom of movement.
The interview took place at the police station.

The setting

for the interrogation, therefore, was inherently intimidating.
In spite of this coercive setting, the United States Supreme
Court found that the defendant was not under "custodial
interrogation."
Following the decision in Mathiason, the trial court
in the present case erred in concluding that the appellant was
under custodial interrogation when given the Miranda warning.
Consequently, the prior warning could not be substituted to
satisfy the requirements of Miranda.

-8-
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The constitutional requirements that, as a prerequisite to any questioning, an individual held for
interrogation by a law enforcement officer has a right to
remain silent does not depend upon whether he is aware of
his rights without a warning being given.

Again, the warnings

were not given when the appellant was taken into custody.

The

procedural safeguards established in Miranda were not upheld.
There is no question that the statements obtained
by police officers in violation of Miranda were prejudicial.
Officer Michael George interrogated the appellant, and during
this questioning the appellant allegedly confessed to distributing a controlled substance.

Officer George testified that

the appellant stated, "Yeah, I deal dope, but I sold my last
bag last night."

(Tr. 35).

This statement amounts to an alleged confession on
the part of the appellant to the crime charged.

It tends to

establish his guilt and should not have been admitted into
evidence in violation of Miranda and his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
POINT II
FAILURE TO ADVISE APPELLANT THAT WHILE UNDER
"CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION" HE COULD CEASE
MAKING ANY STATEMENT AT ANY TIME WAS A
VIOLATION OF HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AND
MIRANDA.

-9-
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The American accusatory system of criminal justice
demands that the government seeking to punish an individual
produce the evidence against him by its own independent labor,
rather than by the expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth.

The privilege against self-incrimination is accorded

a liberal construction.

The privilege against self-incriminat

is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.
If an individual held for interrogation by police
indicates in any manner at any time prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation mus:
cease.

An accused who remains silent after being given his

Miranda warnings signifies his election to remain silent and
may not thereafter be questioned in any way without proof of
a clear, intelligent and understanding waiver either declared
or by conduct of his right to remain silent.
It has clearly been established that a defendant ha1
a constitutionally protected right to cut off questioning
when he has indicated he will not make a statement.

~

v. Arizona, 384 U.S., 436, 473-474, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-106, 46
L. Ed. 2d 313, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975). Accordingly, a warning
of that right should precede custodial interrogation.
State v. Workmen, 435 P.2d 919, reversed per curiam
-10-
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21 L. Ed. 2d 20 dealt with the warning to an accused of his
right to have an appointed counsel present during custodial
interrogation.

By analogy, the Fifth Amendment of the United

States Constitution right against self-incrimination and
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah should
compel a warning of the constitutional right to cut off
questioning as a necessity for fair procedure to protect the
broad base of protected silence under the constitutions.
For without a prior warning of the privilege to
control the interrogation as a balance against the coercive
custodial environment, the accused remains ignorant of this
important constitutionally protected privilege to cut off
questioning.

It is submitted that this right is not scrup-

ulously honored as mandated by the United States Supreme
Court in the Mosley case unless a procedural protective
warning containing that right is given to the accused prior
to interrogation.
Mosley also implies by its holding that a fresh
set of warnings be given after a significant time lapse
betwen interrogations.
Miranda warning cards customarily carried by police
officers to be read to suspects preceding custodial interrogation state:
-11-
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1.

You have the right to remain silent.

2.

Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law.

3.

You have the right to talk to a lawyer
and have him present with you while you
are being questioned.

4.

If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer
one will be appointed to represent you
before you answer questions, if you
wish.

S.

If you wish to answer questions now
without contacting a lawyer or without
a lawyer present, you have the right to
stop answering questions at any time.

Appellant's constitutional right to stop answering
questions was omitted in violation of Miranda and his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.

CONCLUSION
Because the police did not warn the accused of his
constitutional rights to cut off questioning and because his
silence was not scrupulously honored during custodial interro·
gation, all incriminating statements made by him were inadmissible and should have been suppressed.

-12-
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This case should be reversed, or, in the alternative,
the appellant should be granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

By~fit
\ tJZi
P i L.ansen

1·

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant were served on Robert B. Hansen, Utah State
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, this

~~~~day

of November, 1978.
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